Reform and Opening Up - Revision history

imported>Azadsingh: Fix pinyin

2025-11-01T07:07:10Z

Fix pinyin

← Older revision		Revision as of 07:07, 1 November 2025
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	'''Reform and Opening Up''' (Pinyin: gǎigé ~~kāifàn~~; Simplified Chinese: 改革开放) is a policy of internal reform and external opening that [[China]] began to implement at the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978. China's internal reforms started with the rural areas. In November 1978, Xiaogang Village, Fengyang County, Anhui Province implemented the household contract responsibility system (Lump Sum Contract Responsibility system ) of "dividing land to households and responsible for their own profits and losses ".		'''Reform and Opening Up''' (Pinyin: gǎigé kāifàng; Simplified Chinese: 改革开放) is a policy of internal reform and external opening that [[China]] began to implement at the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978. China's internal reforms started with the rural areas. In November 1978, Xiaogang Village, Fengyang County, Anhui Province implemented the household contract responsibility system (Lump Sum Contract Responsibility system ) of "dividing land to households and responsible for their own profits and losses ".

	On July 15, 1979, the central government officially approved the implementation of special policies and flexible measures in foreign economic activities in Guangdong and Fujian provinces, which marked a historic step towards reform and opening up. Opening up to the outside world has become a basic national policy of China. The road is a powerful driving force for the development of the socialist cause. Reform and opening up established a Socialist Market Economy. In 1992, the Southern Talk announced that China's reform had entered a new stage. Reform and opening up have brought about tremendous changes in China. The 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in October 1992 announced that the most distinctive feature of the new era is reform and opening up, and China's reform has entered a new reform period. In 2013, China entered a new era of comprehensively deepening reforms . Deepening reform and opening up requires adhering to the direction of socialism.<ref name=":7">[https://baike.baidu.com/reference/886098/f7709qd-xcLfI2zTzRMAbRxM27Rz4BKCl6kEX8uTKvsoMY3v6jTEdJblZLHIj_syYx1TVir5JLZht4Y-YI14-VhGZO7eis1TQoy2UNZ5UDxJmeMj0mH7P-Mq How did Xi Zhongxun lead Guangdong's reform and opening up to "take the first step"?] - Chinese Communist Party News Network</ref><ref name=":8">[https://baike.baidu.com/reference/886098/c156ggTcuMkBQ-3lBoHpdcYoOXlUCiRAwrdEjSCafFgBGh5AY_0ryR_pk0wvEKRgz0lkFd6mSifCia2uBhb8RwQLfLEK0hKs6dDn The fourth of Xi Jinping's five development concepts: reform and opening up is the basic national policy] - Sohu News</ref>		On July 15, 1979, the central government officially approved the implementation of special policies and flexible measures in foreign economic activities in Guangdong and Fujian provinces, which marked a historic step towards reform and opening up. Opening up to the outside world has become a basic national policy of China. The road is a powerful driving force for the development of the socialist cause. Reform and opening up established a Socialist Market Economy. In 1992, the Southern Talk announced that China's reform had entered a new stage. Reform and opening up have brought about tremendous changes in China. The 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in October 1992 announced that the most distinctive feature of the new era is reform and opening up, and China's reform has entered a new reform period. In 2013, China entered a new era of comprehensively deepening reforms . Deepening reform and opening up requires adhering to the direction of socialism.<ref name=":7">[https://baike.baidu.com/reference/886098/f7709qd-xcLfI2zTzRMAbRxM27Rz4BKCl6kEX8uTKvsoMY3v6jTEdJblZLHIj_syYx1TVir5JLZht4Y-YI14-VhGZO7eis1TQoy2UNZ5UDxJmeMj0mH7P-Mq How did Xi Zhongxun lead Guangdong's reform and opening up to "take the first step"?] - Chinese Communist Party News Network</ref><ref name=":8">[https://baike.baidu.com/reference/886098/c156ggTcuMkBQ-3lBoHpdcYoOXlUCiRAwrdEjSCafFgBGh5AY_0ryR_pk0wvEKRgz0lkFd6mSifCia2uBhb8RwQLfLEK0hKs6dDn The fourth of Xi Jinping's five development concepts: reform and opening up is the basic national policy] - Sohu News</ref>

170.140.105.18 at 16:38, 8 February 2024

2024-02-08T16:38:42Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 16:38, 8 February 2024
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	==== Economic Precursor to Reform and Opening Up ====		==== Economic Precursor to Reform and Opening Up ====
	The first economic reforms took place in 1972 with the implementation of the [https://en.prolewiki.org/wiki/43_Plan 43 Plan] proposed by [[Zhou Enlai]].<ref>[https://archive.org/details/wen-tiejun-ten-crises-online-pdf-20210619-revised-1/page/193/mode/2up The Political Economy of China’s Development (1949–2020)] - Wen Tiejun, Page 194</ref> Roughly 4.24 billion US dollars worth of financial investment poured in from over 20 Capitalist countries, primarily Japan and the USA. However, in 1978, in accordance to the 82 Plan proposed by Hua Guofeng, 7.8 Billion US dollars worth of financial investment of roughly around 22 projects. The 43 Plan implemented under [[Mao Zedong]] and the 82 Plan implemented under Hua Guofeng differed only in amount. The contents were consistent, even as early as the 1972, reform was the inevitable path forward for the CPC.		The first economic reforms took place in 1972 with the implementation of the [https://en.prolewiki.org/wiki/43_Plan 43 Plan] proposed by [[Zhou Enlai]].<ref>[https://archive.org/details/wen-tiejun-ten-crises-online-pdf-20210619-revised-1/page/193/mode/2up The Political Economy of China’s Development (1949–2020)] - Wen Tiejun, Page 194</ref> Roughly 4.24 billion US dollars worth of financial investment poured in from over 20 Capitalist countries, primarily from Japan and the USA. However, in 1978, in accordance to the 82 Plan proposed by Hua Guofeng, 7.8 Billion US dollars worth of financial investment of roughly around 22 projects was invested. The 43 Plan implemented under [[Mao Zedong]] and the 82 Plan implemented under Hua Guofeng differed only in amount. The contents were consistent, even as early as the 1972, reform was the inevitable path forward for the CPC.

	Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, Premier of the State Council, initiated a new wave of importing advanced foreign technologies and equipment in 1972. After one of Mao’s service staff told Mao that she queued for hours to buy some Dacron fabric, Mao had a conversation with Zhou about buying Western technologies for producing chemical fibers. Then Zhou instructed the State Council Working Group and the State Planning Commission (SPC) to prepare a report on importing chemical fibers and chemical fertilizer producing equipment. "The Report on Importing Complete Sets of Chemical Fibers and Chemical Fertilizers Producing Equipment" proposed to import four complete sets of chemical fiber producing equipment with capacity of 240,000 tons, two complete sets of 300,000-ton synthetic ammonia-producing equipment, and key equipment, spare parts and steel for construction or renovation of other chemical fertilizer factories, with a budget of US$400 million. Zhou and Mao approved the plan in February 1972. The Ministry of Light Industry and the Ministry of Fuel and Chemical Industries were responsible for implementing the plan. <ref>[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/362740804_Grassroots_and_local_initiatives_versus_the_architect%27s_design_during_China%27s_reform_and_opening_process Grassroots and local initiatives versus the architect’s design during China’s reform and opening process] - Qing Pingma, University of Nottingham Ningbo China</ref>		Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, Premier of the State Council, initiated a new wave of importing advanced foreign technologies and equipment in 1972. After one of Mao’s service staff told Mao that she queued for hours to buy some Dacron fabric, Mao had a conversation with Zhou about buying Western technologies for producing chemical fibers. Then Zhou instructed the State Council Working Group and the State Planning Commission (SPC) to prepare a report on importing chemical fibers and chemical fertilizer producing equipment. "The Report on Importing Complete Sets of Chemical Fibers and Chemical Fertilizers Producing Equipment" proposed to import four complete sets of chemical fiber producing equipment with capacity of 240,000 tons, two complete sets of 300,000-ton synthetic ammonia-producing equipment, and key equipment, spare parts and steel for construction or renovation of other chemical fertilizer factories, with a budget of US$400 million. Zhou and Mao approved the plan in February 1972. The Ministry of Light Industry and the Ministry of Fuel and Chemical Industries were responsible for implementing the plan. <ref>[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/362740804_Grassroots_and_local_initiatives_versus_the_architect%27s_design_during_China%27s_reform_and_opening_process Grassroots and local initiatives versus the architect’s design during China’s reform and opening process] - Qing Pingma, University of Nottingham Ningbo China</ref>

imported>All that is Solid: removed links to prolewiki

2024-02-08T06:44:46Z

removed links to prolewiki

← Older revision		Revision as of 06:44, 8 February 2024
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	==== Economic Precursor to Reform and Opening Up ====		==== Economic Precursor to Reform and Opening Up ====
	The first economic reforms took place in 1972 with the implementation of the [https://en.prolewiki.org/wiki/43_Plan 43 Plan] proposed by [[Zhou Enlai]].<ref>[https://archive.org/details/wen-tiejun-ten-crises-online-pdf-20210619-revised-1/page/193/mode/2up The Political Economy of China’s Development (1949–2020)] - Wen Tiejun, Page 194</ref> Roughly 4.24 billion US dollars worth of financial investment from over 20 ~~countries from~~ Capitalist countries, primarily ~~[https://en.prolewiki.org/wiki/Japan~~ Japan] and the ~~[https://en.prolewiki.org/wiki/United_States_of_America~~ USA]. However, in 1978, in accordance to the 82 Plan proposed by Hua Guofeng, 7.8 Billion US dollars worth of financial investment of roughly around 22 projects. The 43 Plan implemented under [[Mao Zedong]] and the 82 Plan implemented under Hua Guofeng differed only in amount. The contents were consistent, even as early as the 1972, reform was the inevitable path forward for the CPC.		The first economic reforms took place in 1972 with the implementation of the [https://en.prolewiki.org/wiki/43_Plan 43 Plan] proposed by [[Zhou Enlai]].<ref>[https://archive.org/details/wen-tiejun-ten-crises-online-pdf-20210619-revised-1/page/193/mode/2up The Political Economy of China’s Development (1949–2020)] - Wen Tiejun, Page 194</ref> Roughly 4.24 billion US dollars worth of financial investment poured in from over 20 Capitalist countries, primarily Japan and the USA. However, in 1978, in accordance to the 82 Plan proposed by Hua Guofeng, 7.8 Billion US dollars worth of financial investment of roughly around 22 projects. The 43 Plan implemented under [[Mao Zedong]] and the 82 Plan implemented under Hua Guofeng differed only in amount. The contents were consistent, even as early as the 1972, reform was the inevitable path forward for the CPC.

	Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, Premier of the State Council, initiated a new wave of importing advanced foreign technologies and equipment in 1972. After one of Mao’s service staff told Mao that she queued for hours to buy some Dacron fabric, Mao had a conversation with Zhou about buying Western technologies for producing chemical fibers. Then Zhou instructed the State Council Working Group and the State Planning Commission (SPC) to prepare a report on importing chemical fibers and chemical fertilizer producing equipment. "The Report on Importing Complete Sets of Chemical Fibers and Chemical Fertilizers Producing Equipment" proposed to import four complete sets of chemical fiber producing equipment with capacity of 240,000 tons, two complete sets of 300,000-ton synthetic ammonia-producing equipment, and key equipment, spare parts and steel for construction or renovation of other chemical fertilizer factories, with a budget of US$400 million. Zhou and Mao approved the plan in February 1972. The Ministry of Light Industry and the Ministry of Fuel and Chemical Industries were responsible for implementing the plan. <ref>[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/362740804_Grassroots_and_local_initiatives_versus_the_architect%27s_design_during_China%27s_reform_and_opening_process Grassroots and local initiatives versus the architect’s design during China’s reform and opening process] - Qing Pingma, University of Nottingham Ningbo China</ref>		Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, Premier of the State Council, initiated a new wave of importing advanced foreign technologies and equipment in 1972. After one of Mao’s service staff told Mao that she queued for hours to buy some Dacron fabric, Mao had a conversation with Zhou about buying Western technologies for producing chemical fibers. Then Zhou instructed the State Council Working Group and the State Planning Commission (SPC) to prepare a report on importing chemical fibers and chemical fertilizer producing equipment. "The Report on Importing Complete Sets of Chemical Fibers and Chemical Fertilizers Producing Equipment" proposed to import four complete sets of chemical fiber producing equipment with capacity of 240,000 tons, two complete sets of 300,000-ton synthetic ammonia-producing equipment, and key equipment, spare parts and steel for construction or renovation of other chemical fertilizer factories, with a budget of US$400 million. Zhou and Mao approved the plan in February 1972. The Ministry of Light Industry and the Ministry of Fuel and Chemical Industries were responsible for implementing the plan. <ref>[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/362740804_Grassroots_and_local_initiatives_versus_the_architect%27s_design_during_China%27s_reform_and_opening_process Grassroots and local initiatives versus the architect’s design during China’s reform and opening process] - Qing Pingma, University of Nottingham Ningbo China</ref>
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	Regarding the 10 years of the "Cultural Revolution", the document mentioned:		Regarding the 10 years of the "Cultural Revolution", the document mentioned:

	The 10 years of the ~~[https://en.prolewiki.org/wiki/Great_Proletarian_Cultural_Revolution~~ Cultural Revolution] caused the party, the country and the people to suffer the most serious setbacks and losses since the founding of the People's Republic. History has proved that the thesis of the "Cultural Revolution" did not conform to China's reality and did not conform to Marxism-Leninism. These theories were completely wrong in their estimation of the class situation in China and the political situation of the party and the country at that time. Practice has proved that the "Cultural Revolution" was not and could not be a revolution or social progress in any sense . It does not "disorder the enemy" at all, but disrupted China. Therefore, it was never been possible to achieve this supposed social progress in the first place. History has proven that the "Cultural Revolution" was a civil strife wrongly launched by leaders and exploited by counter-revolutionary groups, which brought serious disasters to the party, state and people of all ethnic groups. It was a social regression. In October 1976, the conspiracy of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing Ultra-Leftist counter-revolutionary clique was smashed, the party was saved from danger, the revolution was saved, and China entered a new period of historical development.<ref>[https://www.hudong.com/page/reference_snapshot?wiki_doc_id=6969388908614735142&ref_url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.qstheory.cn%2Fllqikan%2F2019-01%2F08%2Fc_1123962603.htm&collect_params=%22%7B%5C%22search_query%5C%22%3A%5C%22%E6%94%B9%E9%9D%A9%E5%BC%80%E6%94%BE%5C%22%2C%5C%22search_id%5C%22%3A%5C%2218zaloe5xyyo00%5C%22%2C%5C%22source%5C%22%3A%5C%22homepage%5C%22%2C%5C%22doc_title%5C%22%3A%5C%22%E6%94%B9%E9%9D%A9%E5%BC%80%E6%94%BE%5C%22%2C%5C%22doc_id%5C%22%3A%5C%226969388908614735142%5C%22%2C%5C%22view_id%5C%22%3A%5C%223vcwd9vi02k000%5C%22%2C%5C%22first_classify%5C%22%3A%5C%22%E6%A6%82%E5%BF%B5%5C%22%2C%5C%22second_classify%5C%22%3A%5C%22%5C%22%2C%5C%22third_classify%5C%22%3A%5C%22%5C%22%2C%5C%22referer%5C%22%3A%5C%22https%3A%2F%2Fwww.hudong.com%2F%5C%22%7D%22 The Political Wisdom of the Party Central Committee to Solve the Evaluation Problem of the "Cultural Revolution" at the Beginning of the Reform and Opening Up. -] Qiushi.com</ref>		The 10 years of the Cultural Revolution caused the party, the country and the people to suffer the most serious setbacks and losses since the founding of the People's Republic. History has proved that the thesis of the "Cultural Revolution" did not conform to China's reality and did not conform to Marxism-Leninism. These theories were completely wrong in their estimation of the class situation in China and the political situation of the party and the country at that time. Practice has proved that the "Cultural Revolution" was not and could not be a revolution or social progress in any sense . It does not "disorder the enemy" at all, but disrupted China. Therefore, it was never been possible to achieve this supposed social progress in the first place. History has proven that the "Cultural Revolution" was a civil strife wrongly launched by leaders and exploited by counter-revolutionary groups, which brought serious disasters to the party, state and people of all ethnic groups. It was a social regression. In October 1976, the conspiracy of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing Ultra-Leftist counter-revolutionary clique was smashed, the party was saved from danger, the revolution was saved, and China entered a new period of historical development.<ref>[https://www.hudong.com/page/reference_snapshot?wiki_doc_id=6969388908614735142&ref_url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.qstheory.cn%2Fllqikan%2F2019-01%2F08%2Fc_1123962603.htm&collect_params=%22%7B%5C%22search_query%5C%22%3A%5C%22%E6%94%B9%E9%9D%A9%E5%BC%80%E6%94%BE%5C%22%2C%5C%22search_id%5C%22%3A%5C%2218zaloe5xyyo00%5C%22%2C%5C%22source%5C%22%3A%5C%22homepage%5C%22%2C%5C%22doc_title%5C%22%3A%5C%22%E6%94%B9%E9%9D%A9%E5%BC%80%E6%94%BE%5C%22%2C%5C%22doc_id%5C%22%3A%5C%226969388908614735142%5C%22%2C%5C%22view_id%5C%22%3A%5C%223vcwd9vi02k000%5C%22%2C%5C%22first_classify%5C%22%3A%5C%22%E6%A6%82%E5%BF%B5%5C%22%2C%5C%22second_classify%5C%22%3A%5C%22%5C%22%2C%5C%22third_classify%5C%22%3A%5C%22%5C%22%2C%5C%22referer%5C%22%3A%5C%22https%3A%2F%2Fwww.hudong.com%2F%5C%22%7D%22 The Political Wisdom of the Party Central Committee to Solve the Evaluation Problem of the "Cultural Revolution" at the Beginning of the Reform and Opening Up. -] Qiushi.com</ref>

	==== Economic Situation prior to Reform and Opening Up ====		==== Economic Situation prior to Reform and Opening Up ====
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	China has had a 100% positive change in food costs compared to the mean index of 78%. A 100% positive change in food safety net programmes compared to the mean of 72.4%. A score of 78.9 compared to the mean of 57.6 of access to agricultural input for farmers. A score of 98.6 for food volatility compared to the mean of 68.7. A score of 69.3 for supply chain infrastructure compared to the mean of 61.9. A score of 100 for commitment to input food security policies compared to the mean of 47. A protein quality of 83.8 compared to the mean of 68.5 and a food safety of 92.4 compared to the mean of 76.4.<ref>[https://impact.economist.com/sustainability/project/food-security-index/explore-countries/china Global Food Security Index 2022 on China]</ref>		China has had a 100% positive change in food costs compared to the mean index of 78%. A 100% positive change in food safety net programmes compared to the mean of 72.4%. A score of 78.9 compared to the mean of 57.6 of access to agricultural input for farmers. A score of 98.6 for food volatility compared to the mean of 68.7. A score of 69.3 for supply chain infrastructure compared to the mean of 61.9. A score of 100 for commitment to input food security policies compared to the mean of 47. A protein quality of 83.8 compared to the mean of 68.5 and a food safety of 92.4 compared to the mean of 76.4.<ref>[https://impact.economist.com/sustainability/project/food-security-index/explore-countries/china Global Food Security Index 2022 on China]</ref>

	In 2012 ~~it was found by~~ the Food and Agriculture Organization that China (-96 million) and Viet Nam (-24 million) amounts to 91 percent of the net numerical reduction in undernourished people since 1990-92. Scholars associate land reform with China’s advance against hunger (and SOFI12 acknowledges small farmer access to land in China as key); to understanding the progress of China and Viet Nam, experts cite egalitarian land reform as a key. In both countries, small holders secured access to land through state policies. SOFI12 also notes the “situation of relatively equal access to farmland and human capital” in China as important in China's striking progress against hunger.<ref>[https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/Framing%20Hunger.pdf '''FRAMING HUNGER, A Response to The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2012''' - May 22 2013] - FAO</ref>		In 2012 the Food and Agriculture Organization found that China (-96 million) and Viet Nam (-24 million) amounts to 91 percent of the net numerical reduction in undernourished people since 1990-92. Scholars associate land reform with China’s advance against hunger (and SOFI12 acknowledges small farmer access to land in China as key); to understanding the progress of China and Viet Nam, experts cite egalitarian land reform as a key. In both countries, small holders secured access to land through state policies. SOFI12 also notes the “situation of relatively equal access to farmland and human capital” in China as important in China's striking progress against hunger.<ref>[https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/Framing%20Hunger.pdf '''FRAMING HUNGER, A Response to The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2012''' - May 22 2013] - FAO</ref>

	Labor productivity increased in the post-reform area, the annual growth rate of GVA per worker was only 0.8 per cent per year between 1955 and 1981, whereas it grew at a rate of nearly 5 per cent per year after 1981.<ref>Page 232, Chinese Economic Development - Chris Bramall</ref> From 1981 - 2006, the gross output value of farming was 4.3% and gross output value of agriculture was 5.5%. Compared from the period of 1954 - 1981 of 2.9 and 3.3% respectively. In terms of value added overall, it was 4.2% for 1981 - 2006. And 2.7% for 1954 - 1983.<ref>Chinese Economic Development - Chris Bramall, page 228</ref>		Labor productivity increased in the post-reform area, the annual growth rate of GVA per worker was only 0.8 per cent per year between 1955 and 1981, whereas it grew at a rate of nearly 5 per cent per year after 1981.<ref>Page 232, Chinese Economic Development - Chris Bramall</ref> From 1981 - 2006, the gross output value of farming was 4.3% and gross output value of agriculture was 5.5%. Compared from the period of 1954 - 1981 of 2.9 and 3.3% respectively. In terms of value added overall, it was 4.2% for 1981 - 2006. And 2.7% for 1954 - 1983.<ref>Chinese Economic Development - Chris Bramall, page 228</ref>

imported>XigmaXillionaire81: Added in references title

2024-01-15T04:42:07Z

Added in references title

← Older revision		Revision as of 04:42, 15 January 2024
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	From 1952 to 1978, labor productivity in industry and construction increased 2.11x, while from 1978 to 2003, it increased 6.21x. In yearly measurements, from 1978 to 2003 grew 6.5% per annum, compared to the 3.7% from 1952 to 1978.<ref name=":53">Chinese Econonomic Performance in the Long Run: 960–2030 AD by Angus Maddison, page 80</ref> Labor productivity as a percentage relative to the USA grew by 4.3% from 1978 to 1994, compared to 0.4% from 1952 to 1978.<ref name=":32" />		From 1952 to 1978, labor productivity in industry and construction increased 2.11x, while from 1978 to 2003, it increased 6.21x. In yearly measurements, from 1978 to 2003 grew 6.5% per annum, compared to the 3.7% from 1952 to 1978.<ref name=":53">Chinese Econonomic Performance in the Long Run: 960–2030 AD by Angus Maddison, page 80</ref> Labor productivity as a percentage relative to the USA grew by 4.3% from 1978 to 1994, compared to 0.4% from 1952 to 1978.<ref name=":32" />

			== References ==

imported>XigmaXillionaire81: Created the Reform and Opening Up page, pasted in relevant information about it's successes and historical background

2024-01-15T04:38:44Z

Created the Reform and Opening Up page, pasted in relevant information about it's successes and historical background

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