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Afghan Civil War

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The Afghan Civil War from 1978 to 1992 was a civil war between communist Afghan PDPA and CIA-backed Afghan mujahideen, that temporarily became a war between the social-imperialist Brezhnevite Soviet Union and the Afghan people from 1979 to 1989, known as the Soviet-Afghan War.

Origins

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was the communist party of Afghanistan, allied with the neighboring Soviet Union.

In 1973 it assisted Daoud Khan in overthrowing the monarchy.

In 1978 the PDPA seized power in a coup against Khan with the support of urban workers, known as the Saur Revolution, after Khan began arresting communists, including the leader Nur Mohammed Taraki.

The Soviet Union had advised the PDPA not to seize power yet and was disappointed by the revolution.

Accomplishments

From 1978 to 1979 the PDPA carried out great reforms. However, it was immediately bogged down by an uprising of CIA-backed mujahideen in the countryside in 1978. The mujahideen would turn to Salafism.

The PDPA carried out land reform, waived debts of landless peasants, banned usury, and abolished mortgages made before 1973 (under the monarchy).[1]

In the field of religion, Taraki favored progressive Islam (not state atheism, despite the false claims of Wikipedia). He declared war (metaphorically) on the "bearded men" referring to clergy.[1]

"We want to clean Islam in Afghanistan of the ballast and the dirt of bad traditions, superstition and erroneous belief. Thereafter we will have a progressive modern and pure Islam."

- General Secretary Taraki[1]

The first three decrees of the PDPA started with the Bismillah ("In the name of God the merciful, the compassionate"), though later ones didn't.[1]

Equality of the sexes was proclaimed. Minimum marriage ages were established, 18 for men and 16 for women, and forced marriages were abolished.[1]

Islamists, Maoists, ethnic separatists, and social democrats were purged.

The regime's struggle to liberate the peasantry alienated elite classes, and was framed as an attack on Islam itself.[1]

PDPA infighting

Since 1967, the PDPA was divided between the hardline Khalq and revisionist Parcham factions. The Khalq base was rural Pashtuns while the Parchamites were Persian (Dari-speaking) urbanites supporting socio-economic reforms.[2]

In 1977 the Soviet Union helped reconcile the Khalq and Parcham factions.

At the revolution, the Khalq faction was led by Nur Mohammed Taraki, the Parcham faction by Babrak Karmal. Another key organizer of the revolution was Hafizullah Amin, a Khalqite.

Despite appearing to be a hardliner, Amin was actually a CIA agent, soft on the Islamic clergy opposition, and would brutally abuse the security services against good communists.

Amin vs. Taraki

Hafizullah Amin, a hardline Khalqist, began to conflict with General Secretary Nur Mohammed Taraki, who led with both Khalq and Parchamites. However, Taraki was tough on Parchamites, portraying them as factionalists[3] and in July 1979 announcing "There was no such thing as a Parcham party in Afghanistan, and there is none now".[1]

Backed by a popular personality cult, Taraki gained more and more power.[4] In response, Amin appealed to the PDPA Politburo for "collective leadership".

Amin depicted himself as a devout Muslim[5] and met with Shia communities to appease them, though a revolt broke out anyway among shias in Kabul (the Afghan capital), the first sign of urban unrest.[6]

Taraki identified the US and its fascist allies, Shahite Iran and Zia ul-Haq's Pakistan, as funders of counter-revolution, while Amin only spoke against the UK, trying to avoid alienating the People's Republic of China, which was then allied with the US in supporting Pakistan.[7]

The Soviets did not want Amin to lead Afghanistan, according to a Pravda article in July 1979. This led to Amin consolidating his power through purges, securing a Politburo proposal for "collective leadership", and promoting his supporters.[8] In mid-August, with Soviets visiting, Amin said he wanted closer relations with China, while Taraki met privately with a Soviet official.

Soviet KGB intelligence under Yuri Andropov reported that Amin was probably a CIA agent.

The Soviets advised Taraki to remove Amin from power, but Amin was warned of the plot by a man named Taroon. Taraki's "Gang of Four" (all Khalqists) tried to assassinate him.[9] Taraki invited Amin to the palace, which he refused until persuaded by the Soviet ambassador. There, bodyguards opened fire, killing Taroon and injuring Amin. Amin escaped to the Army building and ordered the arrest of Taraki, who was apprehended while the Gang of Four escaped to the Soviet embassy.

The Soviets tried to rescue Taraki, but it was too late. They suggested Amin only strip Taraki of his positions, but left the decision to kill him up to Amin. Amin executed Taraki by suffocation with pillows on October 8, 1979.[10]

Amin's rule

Amin took power in September 1979. He promoted Islam, building and repairing mosques, distributing the Quran, and invoking Allah and Islam in speeches. He was endorsed by Jamiat ul-Ulama.[11]

Amin released a list of 18,000 executed people, blaming Taraki.[12]

Under Amin, the rebellion of mujahideen, backed by the CIA, continued to escalate.

Amin kept a portrait of Stalin on his desk, saying "Comrade Stalin showed us to build socialism in a backward country."[13] This was probably to distract from:

Amin's counter-revolutionary activities

According to Soviet leaders Yuri Andropov, Andrei Gromyko, Dmitrii Ustinov, Boris Ponomarev, and others, Amin made confidential meetings with US leaders, and was making deals with the right-wing leaders of the Islamic opposition.[14]

The Soviets suspected Amin was a CIA agent. Although the CIA has denied it, Amin is on record admitting to the PDPA that he worked for the CIA during his study in the USA.[15][16] His second stay in the US in 1962, after meeting Taraki in Afghanistan, is when he became a communist, and he led the Afghan students' association, funded by "The Asia Foundation", a CIA front.[17] He returned to Afghanistan, some claim via Moscow[18], others say via West Germany and Lebanon[19], then ruled by Fouad Chehab.

Wikipedia denies that Amin was a CIA agent, citing the CIA.[20]

The KGB reported in December 1979 that Amin was aiming to ally with Pakistan and Iran and reorient towards US and China. He was planning to meet with the Pakistani government led by CIA puppet Zia ul-Haq in December 1979[14], even as Pakistan was funding mujahideen.[21]

In July 1979, under Taraki, but shortly after the Islamic Iranian Revolution, Amin threatened Iran by saying that Afghanistan was not bound by old treaties regarding the Helmand River's water distribution. Iran interpreted this as Soviet-backed aggression.[22]

By fall 1979, morale in the Afghan Army was extremely low, and many believed the jihadis would win.[23]

Soviet coup

In December 1979, the Soviets intervened to execute Amin and install Babrak Karmal. They failed to assassinate him three times, trying to poison him on the 13th[24]only for doctors to save him,[25], snipe him[24], and poison him again on the 27th[24].

On the 25th, Soviet tanks entered Afghanistan in the name of international aid.[26] This entrance was at the request of the Afghans, therefore allowed (see "Afghans request help").

On the 27th, Soviet troops attacked the palace and shot Amin.[27]

The Soviets announced they were following the 1978 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighborliness and that Amin had been executed by a committee of the PDPA.

Babrak Karmal was appointed leader and called Amin a US agent.[28]

Western intervention

See also: Afghan Civil War#Counter-revolutionary activities of Amin

In May 1979, US leaders met with mujahideen including Salafist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, through Pakistan.[29]

The official narrative claims that direct military aid from the US to the mujahideen only began in December 1979. However, evidence contradicts this.

The US indirectly supported the mujahideen from early on, through Pakistan[21] under Zia ul-Haq, a puppet installed by CIA coup[30].

Proof of direct aid

According to a French interview in 1998, US official Zbigniew Brzezinski admitted they began direct military aid in July 1979.[31]

According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahiddin began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But the reality, closely guarded until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention.[32]

Brzezinski denies the quote and maintains aid first arrived in January 1980.[33]

US National Security Council official William Odom said that Brzezinski pumped his fist and said "They have taken the bait!" when the Soviets invaded.[34] Three witnesses confirm this. Odom said it spontaneously, then froze and asked it not to be repeated.[35]

Timeline of external aid

Zia ul-Haq was in power in Pakistan since 1977, and probably funded the mujahideen from the start.

According to Wikipedia, "The first signs of a rebellion appeared on 20 July 1978 in the far eastern provinces of Nuristan and Kunar."[36] Both provinces directly border Pakistan, Khyber Pakhtunwala province. Kunar then bordered the Pakistani province of Federally Administrated Tribal Areas, which the United States Institute for Peace said was a base for mujahideen entering Afghanistan in the 1980s.[37]

The Carter administration began considering direct aid to the mujahideen in March 1979. A memo predicted, "Covert action would raise the costs to the Soviets and inflame Moslem [sic] opinion against them in many countries." [38]

Afghans request help

At the request of the Taraki-Amin government in spring and summer 1979, the Soviets began military involvement in Afghanistan. The Soviets first sold them military equipment and then deployed tanks to guard the palace.[39]

The Soviets were reluctant to intervene directly.[40] In October 1979, the KGB reported that direct deployment would be unwise and lead to war.

The Taraki government repeatedly asked the Soviets for military help. So did Amin. In December, Amin secured a treaty to call on the Soviets for help.[39] This was how the Soviets entered Afghanistan, requested by the Afghans themselves.

The Soviets entered in the name of the 1978 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighborliness.

Course of war

The first major event was the Herat uprising. "In March 1979, Afghans in the western city of Herat responded to rebel calls for a jihad by massacring hundreds of DRA officials and Soviet advisors who were in charge of introducing the women’s literacy program there."[29]

The CIA spread black (unsourced) propaganda about Soviet mines targeting children.

In 1982, the Soviet Army carried out 127 civil operations including house repairs, road building, and distributing food and medicine. It also organized cultural events. [41]

Many locals loved the Soviets and were nostalgic about them afterwards.[41]

The Soviets were not on the verge of being defeated. In fact, the mujahideen were disintegrating by 1985, according to an intelligence official of the State Department.[41]

In 1985, Gorbachev took power and pledged to withdraw from Afghanistan. First he had to install a fellow revisionist Najibullah to lead the PDPA.

By 1989, he fully withdrew. The PDPA lasted 3 more years on its own.

References

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 https://web.archive.org/web/20050321190944/http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue1/jv9no1a2.html
  2. ↑ New York Times "A Tough Ox for Afghans: Najibullah" 1987. https://web.archive.org/web/20090423153915/http://www.nytimes.com/1987/12/02/world/man-in-the-news-a-tough-ox-for-afghans-najibullah.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all
  3. ↑ Rasanayagam p. 71
  4. ↑ Male p. 167
  5. ↑ Male p. 177
  6. ↑ Male p. 179
  7. ↑ Male p. 178
  8. ↑ Brecher p. 357
  9. ↑ Male p. 185
  10. ↑ Misdaq p. 125
  11. ↑ Gladstone p. 118
  12. ↑ Amstutz p. 273
  13. ↑ https://www.historynet.com/afghanistan-fiasco/?f
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 Fujii
  15. ↑ https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/WP51_Web_Final.pdf p. 10
  16. ↑ Soviet Central Committee's International Department, via Lyakhovsky - Tragedy and Valor p. 25, via Fujii.
  17. ↑ Cockburn, Alexander; St. Clair, Jeffrey (2014). Whiteout: The CIA, Drugs, and the Press. Verso Books. ISBN 9781784782610.
  18. ↑ Arnold p. 81
  19. ↑ Misdaq p. 110
  20. ↑ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet%E2%80%93Afghan_War#Soviet_deployment,_1979
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 Tomsen p. 160
  22. ↑ Arnold p. 77
  23. ↑ Brogan, Patrick (1989). The Fighting Never Stopped: A Comprehensive Guide to World Conflicts Since 1945. Vintage Books. ISBN 978-0-679-72033-1. OCLC 319859472. p. 122
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 24.2 Braithwaite p. 94
  25. ↑ https://gordonua.com/publications/zapiski-byvshego-podpolkovnika-kgb-razvedchiki-specialnogo-naznacheniya-v-afganistane-1463248.html
  26. ↑ Braithwaite
  27. ↑ Braithwaite p. 99
  28. ↑ https://web.archive.org/web/20181226105806/http://content.library.arizona.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p16127coll6/id/11040/rec/1
  29. ↑ 29.0 29.1 https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/essay.html
  30. ↑ See Zia ul-Haq
  31. ↑ https://issforum.org/reviews/PDF/AR966.pdf
  32. ↑ David N. Gibbs and William Blum (trans.), "Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Retrospect," International Politics 37:2, 2000, 241-242. Via Greentree, p. 2
  33. ↑ Greentree p. 2
  34. ↑ Jonathan Haslam, Russia's Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 326. Via Greentree, p. 2
  35. ↑ Fujii, who confirmed the quote after Odom's death.
  36. ↑ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People's_Democratic_Party_of_Afghanistan
  37. ↑ Fair, C. Christine; Howenstein, Nicholas; Thier, J. Alexander (December 2006). "Troubles on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border" https://web.archive.org/web/20090509031256/http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2006/1207_pakistan_afghanistan_border.html
  38. ↑ Gates, Robert (2007). From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War. Simon & Schuster. pp. 142, 144–145. ISBN 9781416543367.
  39. ↑ 39.0 39.1 Wikipedia, unsourced. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet%E2%80%93Afghan_War#Soviet_deployment,_1979
  40. ↑ https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/carterbrezhnev/docs_intervention_in_afghanistan_and_the_fall_of_detente/fall_of_detente_chron.pdf
  41. ↑ 41.0 41.1 41.2 Russia Beyond. https://www.rbth.com/history/329986-3-popular-myths-about-soviets

Sources

  • Amtstutz, J. Bruce (1994). Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation. DIANE Publishing. ISBN 978-0788111112. Via Wikipedia: Hafizullah Amin.
  • Arnold, Anthony (1983). Afghanistan's Two-party Communism: Parcham and Khalq. Hoover Press. ISBN 978-0-8179-7792-4. Via Wikipedia: Hafizullah Amin.
  • Braithwaite, Rodric (2011). Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-983265-1. Via Wikipedia: Hafizullah Amin, and Soviet-Afghan War.
  • Brecher, Michael; Wilkenfeld, Jonathan (1997). A Study of Crisis. University of Michigan Press. ISBN 978-0-472-10806-0. Via Wikipedia: Hafizullah Amin.
  • Cockburn, Alexander; St. Clair, Jeffrey (2014). Whiteout: The CIA, Drugs, and the Press. Verso Books. ISBN 9781784782610. Via Wikipedia: Hafizullah Amin.
  • Gladstone, Cary (2001). "Afghanistan: a Country Study (edited by Blood, Baxter, Dupree, Gouttierre & Newell)". Afghanistan Revisited. Nova Publishers. ISBN 978-1590334218. Via Wikipedia: Hafizullah Amin.
  • Male, Beverley (1982). Revolutionary Afghanistan: A Reappraisal. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-0-7099-1716-8. Via Wikipedia: Hafizullah Amin.
  • Misdaq, Nabi (2006). Afghanistan: Political Frailty and External Interference. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-0415702058. Via Wikipedia: Hafizullah Amin.
  • Rasanayagam, Angelo (2005). Afghanistan: A Modern History. I.B.Tauris. ISBN 978-1850438571. Via Wikipedia: Hafizullah Amin.
  • Tomsen, Peter (2011). The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers. PublicAffairs. ISBN 978-1-58648-763-8. Via Wikipedia: Hafizullah Amin.
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