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Afghan Civil War

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The Afghan Civil War from 1978 to 1992 was a civil war between communist Afghan PDPA and CIA-backed Afghan mujahideen, that temporarily became a war between the social-imperialist Brezhnevite Soviet Union and the Afghan people from 1979 to 1989.

Background

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was the communist party of Afghanistan, allied with the neighboring Soviet Union.

Since 1967, the party was divided between the hardline Khalq and revisionist Parcham factions. The Khalq base was rural Pashtuns while the Parchamites were Persian (Dari-speaking) urbanites supporting socio-economic reforms.[1]

In 1973 it assisted Daoud Khan in overthrowing the monarchy.

In 1977 the Soviet Union helped reconcile the Khalq and Parcham factions.

Origins

In 1978 the PDPA seized power in a coup against Khan with the support of urban workers, known as the Saur Revolution, after Khan began arresting communists, including the leader Nur Mohammed Taraki.

At this time the Khalq faction was led by Nur Mohammed Taraki, the Parcham faction by Babrak Karmal. Another key organizer of the revolution was Hafizullah Amin, a Khalqite.

The Soviet Union had advised the PDPA not to seize power yet and was disappointed by the revolution.

Accomplishments

From 1978 to 1979 the PDPA carried out great reforms. However, it was immediately bogged down by an uprising of CIA-backed mujahideen in the countryside in 1978. The mujahideen would turn to Salafism.

Amin vs. Taraki

Hafizullah Amin, a hardline Khalqist, began to conflict with General Secretary Nur Mohammed Taraki, who appointed both Khalq and Parchamites into government, though Taraki portrayed Parchamites as factionalists[2]. Backed by a personality cult, Taraki gained more and more power.[3]

Amin depicted himself as a devout Muslim[4] and met with Shia communities to appease them, though a revolt broke out anyway among shias in Kabul (the Afghan capital), the first sign of urban unrest.[5]

Taraki identified the US and its fascist allies, Shahite Iran and Zia ul-Haq's Pakistan, as funders of counter-revolution, while Amin only spoke against the UK, trying to avoid alienating the People's Republic of China, which was then allied with the US in supporting Pakistan.[6]

The Soviets did not want Amin to lead Afghanistan, according to a Pravda article in July 1979. This led to Amin consolidating his power through purges, securing a Politburo proposal for collective leadership, and promoting his supporters.[7] In mid-August, with Soviets visiting, Amin said he wanted closer relations with China, while Taraki met privately with a Soviet official.

Soviet KGB intelligence under Yuri Andropov reported that Amin was probably a CIA agent.

The Soviets advised Taraki to remove Amin from power, but Amin was warned of the plot by a man named Taroon. Taraki's "Gang of Four" (all Khalqists) tried to assassinate him.Cite error: Closing </ref> missing for <ref> tag

Amin's rule

Amin took power in September 1979. He promoted Islam, building and repairing mosques, distributing the Quran, and invoking Allah and Islam in speeches. He was endorsed by Jamiat ul-Ulama.[8]

Amin released a list of 18,000 executed people, blaming Taraki.[9]

Under Amin, the rebellion of mujahideen, backed by the CIA, continued to escalate.

Soviet coup

The Soviets intervened to execute Amin and install Babrak Karmal.

Soviet-Afghan War

At the request of the Taraki-Amin government in spring and summer 1979, the Soviets began military involvement in Afghanistan. The Soviets first sold them military equipment and then deployed tanks to guard the palace.

The Soviets were reluctant to intervene directly. In October 1979, the KGB reported that direct deployment would be unwise and lead to war.[10]

US intervention

In May 1979, US leaders met with mujahideen including Salafist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

The official narrative claims that direct military aid from the US to the mujahideen only began in December 1979.

According to a French interview in 1998, Zbigniew Brzezinski admitted they began military aid in July 1979.[11]

According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahiddin began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But the reality, closely guarded until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention.[12]

Brzezinski denies the quote and maintains aid first arrived in January 1980.[13]

US National Security Council official William Odom said that Brzezinski pumped his fist and said "They have taken the bait!" when the Soviets invaded.[14] Three witnesses confirm this. Odom said it spontaneously, then froze and asked it not to be repeated.[15]

More details

Zia ul-Haq was in power since 1977, and could have been funding the mujahideen from the start.

According to Wikipedia, "The first signs of a rebellion appeared on 20 July 1978 in the far eastern provinces of Nuristan and Kunar."[16] Both provinces directly border Pakistan, Khyber Pakhtunwala province. Kunar then bordered the Pakistani province of Federally Administrated Tribal Areas, which the United States Institute for Peace said was a base for mujahideen entering Afghanistan in the 1980s.[17]

The Carter administration began considering direct aid to the mujahideen[18]

Backing Amin

The Soviets suspected Amin was a CIA agent. Although the CIA has denied it, Amin is on record admitting to the PDPA that he worked for the CIA during his study in the USA.[19][20] His second stay in the US in 1962, after meeting Taraki in Afghanistan, is when he became a communist, and he led the Afghan students' association, funded by "The Asia Foundation", a CIA front.[21] He returned to Afghanistan, some claim via Moscow[22], others say via West Germany and Lebanon[23], then ruled by Fouad Chehab.

According to Soviet leaders Yuri Andropov, Andrei Gromyko, Dmitrii Ustinov, Boris Ponomarev, and others, Amin made confidential meetings with US leaders, and was making deals with the right-wing leaders of the Islamic opposition. Amin was aiming to ally with Pakistan and Iran and reorient towards US and China. He was scheduled to meet with the Pakistani government led by CIA puppet Zia ul-Haq in December 1979.[24]

Course of war

Further reading: https://www.rbth.com/history/329986-3-popular-myths-about-soviets

References

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Sources

  • Amtstutz, J. Bruce (1994). Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation. DIANE Publishing. ISBN 978-0788111112. Via Wikipedia: Hafizullah Amin.
  • Arnold, Anthony (1983). Afghanistan's Two-party Communism: Parcham and Khalq. Hoover Press. ISBN 978-0-8179-7792-4. Via Wikipedia: Hafizullah Amin.
  • Brecher, Michael; Wilkenfeld, Jonathan (1997). A Study of Crisis. University of Michigan Press. ISBN 978-0-472-10806-0. Via Wikipedia: Hafizullah Amin.
  • Cockburn, Alexander; St. Clair, Jeffrey (2014). Whiteout: The CIA, Drugs, and the Press. Verso Books. ISBN 9781784782610. Via Wikipedia: Hafizullah Amin.
  • Gladstone, Cary (2001). "Afghanistan: a Country Study (edited by Blood, Baxter, Dupree, Gouttierre & Newell)". Afghanistan Revisited. Nova Publishers. ISBN 978-1590334218. Via Wikipedia: Hafizullah Amin.
  • Male, Beverley (1982). Revolutionary Afghanistan: A Reappraisal. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-0-7099-1716-8. Via Wikipedia: Hafizullah Amin.
  • Misdaq, Nabi (2006). Afghanistan: Political Frailty and External Interference. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-0415702058. Via Wikipedia: Hafizullah Amin.
  • Rasanayagam, Angelo (2005). Afghanistan: A Modern History. I.B.Tauris. ISBN 978-1850438571. Via Wikipedia: Hafizullah Amin.
  1. ↑ New York Times "A Tough Ox for Afghans: Najibullah" 1987. https://web.archive.org/web/20090423153915/http://www.nytimes.com/1987/12/02/world/man-in-the-news-a-tough-ox-for-afghans-najibullah.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all
  2. ↑ Rasanayagam p. 71
  3. ↑ Male p. 167
  4. ↑ Male p. 177
  5. ↑ Male p. 179
  6. ↑ Male p. 178
  7. ↑ Brecher p. 357
  8. ↑ Gladstone p. 118
  9. ↑ Amstutz p. 273
  10. ↑ https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/carterbrezhnev/docs_intervention_in_afghanistan_and_the_fall_of_detente/fall_of_detente_chron.pdf
  11. ↑ https://issforum.org/reviews/PDF/AR966.pdf
  12. ↑ David N. Gibbs and William Blum (trans.), "Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Retrospect," International Politics 37:2, 2000, 241-242. Via Greentree, p. 2
  13. ↑ Greentree p. 2
  14. ↑ Jonathan Haslam, Russia's Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 326. Via Greentree, p. 2
  15. ↑ Fujii, who confirmed the quote after Odom's death.
  16. ↑ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People's_Democratic_Party_of_Afghanistan
  17. ↑ Fair, C. Christine; Howenstein, Nicholas; Thier, J. Alexander (December 2006). "Troubles on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border" https://web.archive.org/web/20090509031256/http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2006/1207_pakistan_afghanistan_border.html
  18. ↑ Gates, Robert (2007). From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War. Simon & Schuster. pp. 142, 144–145. ISBN 9781416543367.
  19. ↑ https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/WP51_Web_Final.pdf p. 10
  20. ↑ Soviet Central Committee's International Department, via Lyakhovsky - Tragedy and Valor p. 25, via Fujii.
  21. ↑ Cockburn, Alexander; St. Clair, Jeffrey (2014). Whiteout: The CIA, Drugs, and the Press. Verso Books. ISBN 9781784782610.
  22. ↑ Arnold p. 81
  23. ↑ Misdaq p. 110
  24. ↑ Fujii
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